

**History and background to our operations,  
Rhino Protection and tracking organized Crime  
syndicates.**



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## Introduction

The loss of income from the legal trade in plants, plant material, wildlife and animal derivatives erodes the revenues of governments and undermines their ability to implement development programmes and to strengthen the rule of law. Where they are linked to organized crime, violence, grand corruption or armed conflict, wildlife offences may destabilize governments and threaten regional security. Despite many suggestions that wildlife offences are one of the most profitable forms of organized crime, only after illegal drugs and trafficking in firearms and ammunition, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the true scale of the problem. Fauna and flora are very heterogeneous.

While we make use of selected volunteers as informants, we are a dedicated full time operating intelligence gathering unit, our networking strengths, extensive contact base of law enforcement, conservation, intelligence operatives makes us very



cost effective. As we are not statically based we are able, to move at a moment's notice to problem areas, or areas that are being hit by rhino poachers. We have extensive background in wildlife conservation, tracking and anti-tracking, and follow up operations with aircraft or helicopters, and anti-poaching operations. Our core leader group is involved 24/7 in wildlife intelligence production, collection, analysis. We conduct wildlife investigations on all types of poaching, wildlife smuggling.

## **We consult with the following Departments**

We consult with the following Departments on a regular basis re our operations:

- The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA)
- SAPS HAWKS (ESPU) (Directorate Priority Crimes Unit)
- National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit (NWCRU)
- National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)
- Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)
- ENV Environmental Investigation Vietnam
- SanPARKS E.C.I (Environmental Crime Investigation)
- Environmental Section of Interpol
- Rhino Issue Management: Mr Mavuso Msimang
- Various country wide Anti-Poaching Units
- SanParks, KZN Wildlife investigators
- EWT Rhino Project Management, Manager Kirsty Brebner
- Casino Industry Security/ Surveillance managers
- Various South Africa Private Security Role players
- South African Police Stock Theft Units
- Recognized local and International Role Players
- CITES Intelligence
- Selected members of the IUCN AFRSG
- SARS Charles van Niekerk
- TRAFFIC
- Z.C.T.F Zimbabwe Conservation Task Force
- SavingRhinos.org Rhishja Larson
- IRF International Rhino Federation

## Our History

- Since inception of Anti- Poaching Intelligence Group has never been funded or subsidised to date by any party except myself.
- Formed in 2001 as an area intelligence network in Limpopo Province.
- In January 2012 we were the first organization to call for a temporary moratorium on rhino

Hunting as through intelligence gathered and our in house wildlife investigations it was clear the permit issuing system was being abused by the professional hunting industry in concert with organized crime syndicates, the shadow minister of the Environmental Affairs Gareth Morgan supported us in this regard, and the D.A. called for a temporary moratorium until an in depth investigation could be instituted.

- All members have been specially selected, and either come from an intelligence, police, military, or Security background.
- During 2010 we identified regular shipments of toxic waste being conveyed and dumped in areas in Mozambique, once we identified the ship, we passed the information to the environmental Section of Interpol and the ship the “WEHR BLANKENSE” of Pacific International Lines was intercepted carrying toxic waste. We tracked the same ship carrying illegal Hard Wood timber in 2010 to Thailand, included in the same cargo, was contraband ivory and possible rhino horn, when intercepted by INTERPOL the container had been emptied en route, thus alerting us that there was a leak in Thai Customs, as when the ship had left Beira, Mozambique the ivory was on board.
- We have also investigated the illegal logging of Mozambican Hardwoods poached with assistance and financing of Chinese supplying chainsaws, transport and low interest loans sadly vast areas of natural Hardwoods have been denuded in Mozambique.
- Most of our operators are registered security officers, and are currently in management positions.
- We have already successfully, taken down an organised crime rhino poaching syndicate in Northwest Province, and supplied intelligence on other syndicates.
- During 2002 while based in Limpopo Province, Ellisras District, the head of Anti-Poaching Intelligence Group Southern Africa, Kevin Bewick supplied the intelligence for one of the biggest reptile smuggling busts in South Africa.
- In 2008 we identified and started tracking the activities of Out of Africa Safari’s and one Janneman Dawie Groenewald, we completed an extensive dossier of illegal hunting of many species including Black & White rhino by him and many other Professional Hunters, in Zimbabwe by our members active in Zimbabwe. When SanParks investigators arrested him in 2010, we then passed our intelligence gathered over to them, and while we were not responsible for his initial arrest. We passed over very valuable info not known by other investigators, which has resulted in a stronger case against him by the NPA and Asset forfeiture unit.
- A large group of our members have extensive investigative experience.

- We already manage an effective wildlife intelligence network.
- While we are active in all provinces in South Africa, and all regional Southern African countries, we have concentrated our efforts in Mozambique to assist SanParks investigators and while we cannot disclose any details in this regard, we have provided some very worthwhile leads and intelligence, in an attempt to counter the onslaught on rhino in Kruger National Park.
- We track incidents of wildlife poisoning and have been active as far back as 2001 in investigating poisoning incidents of Leopards, Black Backed Jackal, Vultures and other mammals. During 2002 we assisted Dr G. Verdoorn and attended workshops of the EWT Poison Working Group, held in Limpopo Province, we assisted in tracking of stocks of Aldicarb (Temic) in the region, and assisted in removing these stocks. We gathered vast amounts of intelligence of incidents and persons using Temic, to poach game birds, Caracul, Leopard, and Vultures. We still track and investigate poisoning use against African Wildlife and have identified various trends and availability of Temic and have identified that the poison has been used against African Lions in Kenya and Tanzania. We identified the widespread use of Furadan against wildlife in Uganda. During 2012 our sources in Mozambique reported to us that local population in Mozambique had identified areas of toxic waste dumped in a number of areas, but worse was the fact that the contaminated sand was being thrown into river systems to catch fish (Tilapea ).
- Salaries are only required for our field FAST teams.
- We have supplied large chunks of intelligence and links of syndicate members that has contributed to the successful prosecution of other organised crime rhino poaching syndicates in Limpopo Province, Mpumalanga Province and North West Province.

During 2010-2011 we had a loan vehicle and one FAST TEAM that was very successful in the field, all of those operations were self funded by myself with my personal funds, our methods are tried and trusted.

### **Rhino Poaching Southern Africa:**

It must be recognized that rhino poaching has always been around in Africa, and that the two species of rhino, Black and White, will always be under threat. During the last number of years rhino have always been poached, but the annual numbers poached were manageable. During 2007 our group which is a specialist wildlife intelligence group, was alerted by ever increasing incidents, and intelligence gathered identified a marked increase specifically in rhino poaching.

From 10 rhino poached 2004, 19 rhino poached 2005, 28 rhino poached 2006, 15 rhino poached 2007, we tracked a large increase in 2008, when 87 rhino were poached, it was an all-time high. Worse was to come the next year 2009. While we had mainly concentrated our activities to the Western sector of Limpopo Province, in 2008 concerned about the

increase we expanded our activities to all provinces in South Africa. We ended the year of 2009, with and all time high of 122 rhino's poached.

Our group which had never received funding was stretched financially to and all time high. Our expansion into all provinces stretched resources to the limit. We had always made use of volunteers, and through networking managed to recruit more volunteer's country wide, we expanded into OSINT (Open source intelligence gathering) and also started a monitoring function of all social media platforms in an attempt to gather more intelligence and get a handle on what was happening re the increase in rhino poaching. It was soon apparent that the increase had not only taken us by surprise but also all anti-poaching units, private rhino owners, and national game reserves.

While Organized crime syndicates were known to operate in South Africa, the scale of involvement took us all by surprise. During 2008- 2009 we held meetings with ex intelligence operatives and the consensus was that we start researching all that we could about Organized Crime Syndicates operating in South and Southern Africa, in an attempt to try and counter their activities, and namely the marked increase in rhino poaching. Through Osint searches we obtained a number of ISS research papers written specifically on Organized crime syndicates in South Africa, and further papers written on Organized crime syndicates, by other security specialists, INTERPOL and UNODC (United Nations office on Drugs and Crime). The papers were distributed amongst our senior security members and researched.

An in depth study was instituted by our group on current APU conducting security at various Private, Provincial and National Game reserves, the findings of the study revealed some interesting facts, and security shortfalls contributing to the high numbers of rhino being poached. The research on various registered security companies providing security for private, provincial and national game reserves revealed that there were large gaps in standards being provided at the various reserves. At the highest level was a specific unit run by an Recce , this unit had an extremely high standard of trackers employed, a very high standard of firearm training and marksmanship, a very high standard of tactics employed and a very effective area Intelligence Network, these factors played a large part in arresting the poaching of rhino and other wildlife species in that area of operations. Other security companies surveyed had various strengths but many weaknesses, inadequate firearm training and little or no OPERATIONAL



SECURITY measures in place, and inadequate area intelligence networks, or even worse no



area intelligence network at all. Intelligence is a very specialized field, and cannot be carried out effectively by most civilian security contractors.

These many factors and the proliferation of many organized crime syndicates in Southern Africa contributed to a disastrous 2010 with another all-time record of 333 rhino poached in South Africa in 2010. The CRIME INTELLIGENCE section of the South African Police lacking strong leadership and having senior leadership issues, and questionable effectiveness contributed to the rhino poaching carnage. It became clear that there was a need for a dedicated Wildlife Focused Intelligence Gathering Group such as ours to assist and support other various wildlife enforcement efforts.

During 2010 the NWCRU (National Wildlife Crime Unit) was formed in an attempt to centralize all intelligence gathered by various organizations and role players, our group was already supplying intelligence to ECI of SanParks was included amongst other role players in the NWCRU.

The Specialist South African Police wildlife unit, ESPU of the Directorate of Priority Crimes Unit the Hawks had some good successes from intelligence received and TIP OFF's from the public. It was clear that increased public support by supplying tip off's to NWCRU and increased Wildlife Intelligence Gathering is urgently required. The various units of the South African Police are stretched to the limit, with increased public unrest in service delivery protests, increased drug manufacture and smuggling in the region, rape of elderly and infants, car theft and hijackings, cash in transit robberies , ATM bombings, farm attacks, country wide corruption, increased e mail scams, fraudulent identity documents, cloned credit cards, increased life insurance scams, identity theft, Increase in gang violence and a marked increase in wildlife contraband smuggling of , abalone, rhino horn, ivory, endangered species trafficking, and an illegal trade in lion bones.



From studies conducted by ourselves it became apparent that ORGANIZED CRIME SYNDICATES flourish in regions of INSTABILITY, and South, Southern Africa is no exception. While public opinion and criticism increased over the marked increase in Rhino Poaching, enforcement units bore the brunt of much of this criticism not only by the South African public, but internationally as well. During 2010 it was soon identified that standards of APU (Anti- Poaching Units) would have to be addressed, during 2010 many units underwent re-training up to the high standards required for an APU to be effective.

Numbers of anti-poaching personnel were increased and many fund raising efforts in South Africa re equipped the APU of N.W.P.B., SanParks, KZN Ezemvelo and many private security companies contracted to protect private and provincial game reserves. Perimeter security was increased, air patrols were instituted, crime scene investigation training was instituted,



increased collection and funding was obtained for DNA collection, and judicial processes in wildlife poaching cases were reviewed. Intelligence production was to a large extent ignored, as most parties to large extent never understood the value of INTELLIGENCE LED OPERATIONS.

Intelligence production and collection has historically been ignored by the private security industry in South Africa, the focus has always been on Perimeter security, access control and electronic monitoring and surveillance, guarding and patrolling. During 2010 all funding raised by various parties was concentrated largely on these activities. While all APU should have established AREA INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS feeding and exchanging intelligence to the NWCRCU and NATJOINTS, there is a limit to their effectiveness, these NETWORKS should be maintained while in the course of normal security duties in their local area of operations.

The private security industry in South Africa has a history of hurriedly training personal and deploying them with minimal training or experience in a security position, any security personal trained in intelligence and deployed would be a waste of donor funding as they would not be effective if not adequately trained or experienced, before deployment.

Only extremely experienced intelligence operators should be deployed, or they will be at a disadvantage, as we have found that to be effective, intelligence led operations have to be conducted on an, Area, Provincial, National, Regional and International basis. Although National and Military Intelligence were eventually brought on board under NATJOINTS in 2010- 2011 their contribution to current arrests of rhino poachers in custody is not known. During 2011 the Wildlife Section of INTERPOL called for increased regional and international co operation between various stakeholders and enforcement units.” David Higgins of the Wildlife Section of INTERPOL called for increased INTELLIGENCE LED OPERATIONS to counter increase elephant, rhino poaching and smuggling of wildlife products”.

Scam Organizations: To compound the out of control rhino poaching situation and funding needs of enforcement units of all reserves containing rhino populations, many local “Rhino Support” scam organizations appeared on the horizon most in South Africa, but also many abroad, these scam organizations all collecting funds “To Save the Rhino” but most funds collected never reach the intended recipients. These Rhino Scam organizations have grown in number from 2010 – 2012 and serve to divert much needed resources away from enforcement units such as ours who desperately need funds to carry out collection and investigations on the ground and in neighbouring countries.

Regional Operations: Our method of operation is use mobile FAST Teams in areas being hit by rhino poaching syndicates. Research we have conducted reveals that as various game reserves changes tactics and improve controls syndicates identify weaknesses and plan rhino poaching operations around these weaknesses, also all members of APU are monitored by syndicates and names and faces are known in the area, consequently when controls are strengthened and security alert poachers rarely strike, but when syndicates identify weaknesses they exploit them.

A case in point is in the Free State, when managers worked from Monday to Friday and skeleton staff were on weekend duty, syndicates with impunity poached the few Free State rhino out of existence, this has also occurred in other game reserve's. Our mobile FAST teams have the added advantage of not being known in area, vehicles not identified as a regular APU vehicle or a vehicle connected to any manager, supervisor or APU unit member. As we operate in civilian clothes we can easily operate in rural areas posing as various contractors, NGO'S and operate under the guise of day visitors and guests in all major game reserves.

During 2010 – 2011 we conducted intelligence led operations under the guise of local tourists in Imfolozi Game Reserve, Hluhluwe Game reserve ,Pilanesberg Game Reserve, Madikwe Game Reserve, Welgevonden Private Game Reserve , Sabi Sands Game Reserve, and three Game Reserves in Swaziland and



various other Provincial Nature reserves. Our large network of contacts countrywide is that we can always tap into local area knowledge, were ever we operate. During 2011 we conducted and operation as a contractor carrying out servicing of cell phone towers in Swaziland, we covered 6000 kilometres and served every cell tower in Swaziland, during this period we gathered much valuable intelligence of bush meat, smuggled cigarettes , stolen vehicles , general poaching, the drug trade and other organized crime activities in the region. All these operations were sponsored by our members out of their own personal salaries.

### **Private Rhino owners**

All private rhino owners own various size game farms, therefore they are all not poor (no one who owns their own game farm is !). As we all know the cost of purchasing a game farm large enough to contain rhino populations runs into the millions of rand. These game farms are all game fenced, and most contain lodges, and have an income stream from the international tourist or hunting trade, so all have income streams and are run as profitable businesses. There are many hundreds of game farms, lodges country wide, only the very few large high end Lodges own rhino populations, so all are people of "means". Some game farms are only involved in Eco tourism and others are a mix between Eco Tourism and seasonal hunting of various species. Of all the rhino owners researched security arrangements varied from very large security operations on a large private game reserve , to

some game farms containing rhino populations in an area sharing and APU that was based in the area, to other game farms have no meaningful security at all. When purchasing rhino as a species on a private game farm, the onus is not on the State to provide security for rhino populations. In all other types of business activities, the onus is on you to protect your personal assets. Many large Private game reserves conducting safari tourism have large annual income from the international tourist trade. Many have received very large donations from the South African public to prevent rhino poaching while posting large annual profits.

### **Duplication of Efforts:**

All APU's contracted to private rhino owners charge for their services, after researching the subject we found the cheapest price charged was a team of 4 tracker anti-poaching operators at R26 000.00 per team of 4 per month, another quote came in at R37 000.00 per team of 4 anti-poaching operators, others charge more, a well-armed APU game scout with semi- automatic assault weapon came in at a much higher price, at R20 000.00 per , very highly trained game scout. In all the years that I have had contact with APU's the most effective always as a service ran an AREA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OPERATION this was



concentrated within the game reserve and within the surrounding communities all game reserves. Working with, recruiting, informers is always based on "trust" to have effective informers, small teams are required. Costs are a reward system, airtime vouchers and or food provided for the poor of the community. Very few APU's have full time intelligence operator's.

## Warning

### Warnings from environmental section of INTERPOL and other International Police and Intelligence Agencies

“Transnational organized crime is attracting increased attention because whereas in the past the problem was mostly national (mafia, mobsters, cartels, triads), now, as a result of globalization, it poses a threat to international security. This report looks at the relationship between organized crime and instability: how illicit commodities usually originate in trouble spots, are then trafficked through vulnerable regions, to affluent markets. It focuses in particular on the impact of drug flows (cocaine and heroin), as well as piracy around the Horn of Africa, and the impact of minerals smuggling on Central Africa.”

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Definition:

*Transnational organized crime can be explained as a phenomenon that jeopardizes a country's identity, which includes its form of government, its policies and the way it is perceived by other states in the sphere of international relations.*

## Added Value

### The added value of INTELLIGENCE LED environmental law enforcement

- Information that has been evaluated, collated, put in context and analyzed can be used to identify trends, and tactics.
- identify links, frequent offenders, and high-risks areas;
- Intelligence is a useful tool in interpreting facts and opinions, facilitates strategic and tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence is used in strategic forecasts and budget estimations, while tactical intelligence is acted upon immediately by our teams.
- decision making, guides the organization, and allows prediction of likely-to-occur scenarios;
- The value of intelligence is not limited to law enforcement agencies, but also to improving general security.
- political and public awareness and informing decisions at national and international levels;
- An intelligence-led approach to policing will generate evidence and evidence can be brought to court, improving awareness of environmental crime in the judiciary system.

## **1st ICECE Summit Lyon, 27-29 March 2012**

Although international exchange of enforcement intelligence is often raises concern associated with security risks, if managed well these risks are mitigated and easily surpassed by the crucial benefits of information sharing for effective enforcement. Over the last decade, it has become increasingly clear that law enforcement can no longer afford to be solely re-active and agencies have rapidly introduced the concept of intelligence-led enforcement. In aiming to predict when and where incidents are most likely to occur, agencies have realized that intelligence management can no longer be under the sole authority of specialized units working in isolation but must instead be integrated.

Reactive follow ups after a rhino has already has been poached are necessary, but the emphasis must be changed from reactive follow ups to proactive Intelligence led operations, "a week's good intelligence gathering is worth more than a month's patrolling."

## **Advantages of FASTMOBILE TEAMS:**

### **Advantages of using, Anti-Poaching Intelligence Group, FAST MOBILE TEAMS**

- Minimal intelligence, security training is required as operators have years of experience.
- Experienced FAST (field action special intelligence team) teams can be effective immediately and require no training, and so are very cost effective.
- Teams can be quickly be deployed in any part of the country.
- Tactical or "hot" intelligence can be acted on immediately in rural, provincial, towns and cities.
- Teams operate under various covers, and are not identified by syndicates or those insiders working for them.
- Operational Security is not compromised as intelligence operators and vehicles have not being identified in various areas.
- Teams can work regionally posing as tourists, guests or maintenance staff.
- NWCRU can place fast teams in areas where enforcement is known to be weak.
- FAST teams can assist stock theft units, members of DPCU, various APU country wide.
- Can provide surveillance at leaky ports of entry.
- Act as support teams to selected units of South African Police.
- Teams can assist in medical casevac's if required
- We are able to assist members of S.A.P Air wing in tracker follow ups.

## **Intelligence**

Law enforcement is increasingly LED BY INTELLIGENCE . This involves, *inter alia*, the collation, analysis and dissemination of information, and provides a systematic approach to critical thinking, which, in turn, can assist in the prevention and suppression of criminal activities. Well-managed, intelligence-led investigations can often prove more resource- and cost-effective than speculative or reactive methods. In the field of wildlife offences, intelligence relating to perpetrators, smuggling routes, logging and poaching patterns, markets, consumers and so forth is often missing or non-existent. In many countries, the subject of intelligence, including its gathering, collation, analysis and dissemination, is poorly understood, few countries dedicate staff to this subject. Where intelligence related to wildlife crime is taken into account, it can be done in a stand-alone manner so that it is not incorporated into intelligence regarding other types of crimes. Otherwise this restricts the ability to coordinate responses to individual cases or to establish strategies, policies or general operational guidance.

## **Intelligence gathering and exchange**

Information gathering and the exchange of intelligence among the relevant authorities are crucial to the success of measures aimed at curtailing wildlife and offences. To be of maximum value, information gathering activities should focus simultaneously on the strategic, tactical and operational levels. Strategic intelligence enables an accurate analysis of the levels and patterns of wildlife and forest offences at local, national and international levels. Strategic intelligence facilitates law reform, international cooperation, and the development of prevention strategies, education and awareness campaigns. Tactical intelligence supports national and local managers of front-line units in planning activities and deploying resources to achieve operational objectives. Operational intelligence is intelligence on the activities of specific individuals or groups. It can help to identify criminals, provide advance information about their activities, and help to plan proactive, disruptive and further intelligence-led investigations. In the context of wildlife offences, operational intelligence can involve issues such as methods of sourcing wildlife and plants, methods of transportation, methods of document fraud, means of communication, financial transactions, motives, markets, prices and so forth. While it is important to gather information from a wide range of sources, it is likely that the information will vary in quality, and the sources will vary in reliability and motivation. It is essential that information be subjected to some form of analysis and processing before it is disseminated or used. The gathering of information is not in itself sufficient. It is essential that, once gathered and analysed, intelligence be transmitted to the individuals and departments that are able to use it. A vital factor in the expeditious and effective exchange of intelligence is the speed at which material can be transmitted to the relevant agencies or investigators who may be in a position to respond to it. Even excellent intelligence is of little consequence unless its consumers or users believe in its accuracy and usability.

## **Covert techniques**

In the investigation of wildlife offences, which are often very sophisticated and frequently involve a great number of criminal elements, covert investigation techniques may be extremely useful and, in some cases, the only method of investigation. They may involve, for instance, the controlled delivery of prohibited plant or animal material, the use of false company identities, or the use of technical, photographic and video surveillance. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against Corruption also encourage, in so far as possible and permissible under domestic law, the appropriate use of special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance, and undercover operations by competent authorities for the purpose of effectively combating organized crime and corruption. Furthermore, in 2006, the International Cooperation Review Group, as a new surveillance process adopted by the Financial Action Task Force, was set up to identify, examine and engage with vulnerable jurisdictions that fail to implement effective anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing systems. Routine surveillance of the Internet is an additional and emerging method to uncover wildlife offences. This usually involves an examination of online advertisements for fauna and flora, including animal and plant parts and material. Internet surveillance has shown that online websites are frequently used to sell or seek contraband that is not otherwise available legally. It often involves examining popular websites where private individuals offer new or used goods for sale, or post advertisements for sought-after items. Covert surveillance is, however, a particularly intrusive method for collecting evidence. The use of covert investigation techniques involves the careful balancing of a suspect's right to privacy.

## **Information**

The information provided by informants can be vital—and sometimes the only way—to prevent or solve a crime. The effective recruitment and handling of informants can prove significantly more resource and cost-effective compared with other covert methods of investigation. Indeed, the CITES Secretariat encourages the development of a network of informants. This can be facilitated by means of reward schemes and confidential information hotlines to allow the supply of information. However, many informants are themselves criminals with a variety of motivations for providing information and they therefore require careful management. It is thus important to examine the systems employed for using, managing and supervising informants, and the payments made to them.

## **Informants**

- To what extent are informants used by authorities in the investigation of wildlife?
- How are informants managed? In particular, what procedures are in place for contacting?



## **Informants and recording information**

- Are investigators trained in the management of informants?
- Is the identity of informants protected throughout the criminal justice system? If so, how?
- What systems exist to manage the payment of informants? Are such payments subject to external auditing by another government agency?
- What are the rules regarding payments to informants? For example: Who authorizes the payment? How the amount is determined (fee or percentage)? How are funds paid? Which audit procedures are used? Is there any relationship between informant payments and rewards to informants?
- Do rules, procedures and supervisory guidelines establish a difference between the handling of witnesses and informants, and how to cooperate with them?
- Are there standard operating procedures on the handling of informants?

## **Proactive investigations**

- Are wildlife and forest offence investigators deployed (individually or in teams) to investigate pre-identified targets, individuals or groups rather than in response to crime reports?
- Do investigators use analysis and profiling to build a case against a target? If so, how are targets chosen?
- Is there a criminal intelligence cell or unit that collects, collates and analyses information related to wildlife and forest offences and criminals?
- Is there a written requirement that all investigations and prosecutions be properly predicated on the law and lawfully obtained evidence?

## **Interviewing**

Interviewing is a cornerstone of any investigation—and this skill is lacking in wildlife and investigations. For that reason, the CITES Secretariat, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and WCO have published an interview guide for wildlife crime investigators, intended to assist them when questioning smugglers.

There are two basic types of interviews conducted by investigators: interviews with victims and witnesses, and interviews with suspects. Investigators often record the recollections of a witness or victim (assuming they are cooperative). Suspects, on the other hand, usually try to avoid giving truthful answers to investigators' questions and such interviews are therefore more adversarial and may require skilful techniques. International law and standards, along with many domestic laws, limit the use of coercive interviewing techniques and strictly prohibit the use of torture. It is therefore important that investigators have a clear understanding about the boundaries of permissible interviewing techniques.

## **Forensics and crime scene investigation**

The use of science and technology is a vital part of investigating wildlife offences. These offences are “essentially no different from any other form of criminality, and the full range of forensic science, expertise, and support can potentially be brought to bear from one end of the illicit trade chain to the other”. Knowledge of the use of forensic techniques in wildlife

offence investigations can also have relevance to crime prevention as it may deter some would-be offenders. Unfortunately, few officials charged with enforcing wildlife laws in developing countries have access to forensic support or are even aware of it. The provision of forensic services is affected by the legal framework in place and includes issues related to the entering of the crime scene, the conducting of the investigation, the handling, analysis and disposal of evidence and others.

Broadly speaking, for wildlife offences, the use of forensics can be divided into two areas:

- Forensic techniques to assist in the identification or origin of species;
- and forensic techniques to link suspects or physical items to a crime.

The type of forensic examination employed in an investigation varies depending on the nature of the alleged offence. Wildlife poaching and illegal logging, for instance, can be tracked through the use of DNA testing at points of origin, transit and final sale.

Identification and morphological studies can be used to determine the species of a particular animal by using bones, hair, feathers, scales, and other organs and tissues. This can help to establish whether a protected species has been taken illegally. Microscopy or elemental analysis can be used, for example, to identify ivory. Pathological studies involving the examination of carcasses, organs, tissues and other samples from dead animals assist in establishing the cause of an animal's death. Illegal logging and other forms of illegal land clearance, including felling protected trees, can be monitored through satellite technology. Land clearance and compliance with—or transgression of—logging restrictions, for example, can be subjected to aerial surveillance and satellite remote sensing.

## **Enforcement**

A number of techniques can be used to link suspects or physical items to a crime. Bullets recovered from carcasses can be linked to firearms seized from suspects through ballistics. The hands, fingernails, hair and clothing of suspects may contain debris or blood from animals or plants, or firearms residue. Minute traces of a suspect's DNA or fingerprints can be left at or on items connected to the scene of a crime, including seized wildlife. Vehicles and premises may contain remnants of material from a scene. Documents can reveal a suspect's handwriting, fingerprints or DNA. Carved or cut items can reveal physical marks that may be linked to tools.


As wildlife offenders expand their use of technology, an important area of forensic work is the examination of such technology, including the analysis of mobile telephones, computers and storage devices. These can reveal valuable links among individuals, financial transactions and Internet surfing history.

The types of examinations that can be conducted further depend on the capability of the forensic scientist involved and the available laboratory facilities and equipment. If, for instance, the laboratory does not have equipment for DNA testing then such testing cannot be performed. Equally, if the laboratory is not staffed by someone competent in, for example, microscopy, then, notwithstanding the availability of the necessary equipment, the relevant examination cannot be conducted. Consequently, in locations where requisite forensic experts, or forensic equipment or facilities are temporarily or permanently unavailable, mechanisms to obtain or gain access to such expertise or equipment should be developed. In some countries, Customs laboratories have also started to support frontline enforcement with their forensic examination. Several organizations, as well as the world's leading wildlife forensic laboratory (operated by the United States Fish and Wildlife

Service), have offered to provide forensic science support, but so far relatively few countries have made use of it. INTERPOL, through its Environmental Crime Programme, can also assist in providing access to international forensic capabilities.

### **Accountability and integrity**


- Does the law establish mechanisms for the monitoring and oversight of the conduct and performance of wildlife law enforcement officers? If so, what are these mechanisms?
- Are there clear codes of conduct for wildlife law enforcement units? If so, what is their content? Have there been cases of violation of their principles? How have these cases been handled?
- Are officers expected and entitled to report colleagues for failures to maintain integrity and professional standards? Are officers who make such reports protected from victimization or harassment by the law and with practical support?
- Are there avenues for civilians to lodge complaints against the police and those involved in wildlife offences? Is there independent oversight of the complaints system?
- How are wildlife law enforcement officers viewed by other agencies and by the general public? Are they trusted and well respected? If not, why not?



### **Data collection**

Efforts to effectively prevent and suppress wildlife crime are severely hampered by the lack of comprehensive data collection. In spite of the widespread tendency to attempt to estimate the size of the illegal market for fauna and flora, there are few reliable statistics. The absence of any comprehensive data on the scale and spread of wildlife offences has a direct impact on the ability of those charged with enforcing current legislation. If the scale and nature of the problem are not known, it is unlikely that the appropriate measures and resources can be allocated to prevent and suppress it. Without accurate information on wildlife offences, prevention strategies cannot be identified, and suppression activities are rendered useless because insufficient information will not lead to the effective prosecution of offenders. Collecting data on the scale and patterns of wildlife offences is important for evaluating the impact and efficiency of policy, legislation and enforcement programmes, and for providing feedback to policymakers and legislators. Without defensible and realistic baseline data, claims concerning the operation and impact of the strategies to combat wildlife offences cannot be verified, and thus the credibility and commitment of government programmes are left subject to question. Information gleaned from detection measures can also be used for effective campaigns

## Rhino Poached during period 2000 - 2009



Compiled by Brahm Gebhardt



### Crime statistics


Remarkably, few governments have systematic, if any, statistics on wildlife offences. In many countries, statistics on wildlife offences are not collected at all, and even if they are collected they are often fed into broad categories and become inseparable and indistinguishable. Few countries count the number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions under individual offences relating to the wildlife sectors. Even fewer countries separate the number of offences by, for example, type of offender, geographic location or severity of the offence. Even if statistics exist, they are rarely published or otherwise openly available, which further hampers efforts to analyse

and understand the levels and patterns of wildlife and offences and to design adequate strategies to fight them. One of the difficulties in collecting statistics is the fact that wildlife offences are often perceived as victimless crime because complainants will only contact the authorities to report a crime in rare and exceptional circumstances, usually when they experience personal loss or harm. Even where they exist, crime statistics alone do not necessarily provide a good indication of



the prevalence of crime and victimization in a given country because they are greatly influenced by the willingness of victims to report the crime to the police. Victims and witnesses of crime are unlikely to report it to the authorities when they do not have much trust in them or cannot reasonably expect much help from them. Most offences are detected by enforcement agencies, either when they encounter someone engaging in illegal conduct, discover the scenes of illegal logging, illegal hunting, or illegal processing, or if they intercept the smuggling of contraband. In many cases, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a vital role in identifying illegal activities and bringing them to the attention of the authorities. (Traffic)(APIGSA)

Many government agencies tend to use information on seizures and arrests as indicators of wild life and offences, but this is seriously biased to underestimate crime because it reflects law enforcement efforts and incidents that are successfully resolved rather than the accurate number of all cases.



## Technology and information management

Access to information services, such as the Internet and mobile telephones, has increased rapidly in the 2000s. In 2009, mobile telephone access in developing countries passed 50 per cent for the first time, reaching 57 per cent of the population. Technological change has often been taking place at the same time as institutional reforms when former State-owned monopolies have been commercialized or privatized, and competition among service providers has been introduced. Increased access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) has led to the development of e-government and e-governance initiatives, that is, ICT applications for interaction between governments and citizens. The increased use of technology has improved public access to information. Despite the expansion of service networks, a digital divide continues to exist, and information services remain expensive for the average consumer in developing countries. However, there has been a declining trend in ICT costs.

Many natural resource management vulnerabilities can be addressed through the use of ICT. Effective law enforcement systems in the forestry sector consist of prevention, detection and suppression.

Technology has an important role to play in each of these steps, in the efforts to curb the illegal logging, transportation and processing of timber, and trade in wildlife.

A variety of ICT applications can be used to improve deterrence and response, including the following:

- Prevention: crime mapping and corruption hotlines;
- Detection: timber tracking, chain of custody systems, checkpoints, satellite images, global positioning system surveillance; and
- Suppression: crime databases and case management systems.

ICTs can often be applied to identify discrepancies or other early signs of illegality (“red flags”) in a large volume of observation data. These data can be collected through remote sensing, administrative data source, crowd sourcing or various other means. The efficient use of technology makes this activity cost efficient and may have even been impossible through manual means.(Intelligence Analytical Software as required by our group)

## **Police performance indicators**

In law enforcement, the most frequently used indicator is perhaps the percentage of crimes solved by the police out of the total criminal incidents that came to their attention (reported crime). The total case burden, defined as “the number of criminal offences (excluding traffic) per authorized police strength”, is also used as a general measure of workload, and the percentage of crimes solved (by category of crimes) as a performance indicator. This indicator is not always based on very robust data because of (a) changes in crime reporting Behaviour, (b) how the police define a “solved crime” (for example, charges have been laid, the offender has been identified, enough evidence has been accumulated to obtain a conviction or there has been a confession), or (c) all types of crimes may be included or only certain types (for example, only violent crimes). Another indicator that can be used is the percentage of crimes resulting in charges being instigated. With respect to patrolling, the performance indicators that are most commonly used include the number of calls received and responded to (by priority), the response time to different types of calls, and officer utilization time. Sometimes, the “blackout” indicator is used. This refers to the number of times there were no available officers to respond to a call. Each community is unique, and comparisons therefore have very limited value without further assessments of crime types, agency reporting practices, response and investigative policies, and solvability factors.(S.A. Crimes Stats manipulated-Police )

## **Analytic research**

One of the main obstacles to combating wildlife crime more effectively is the lack of systematic and in-depth analytic research on the causes, concepts, circumstances and characteristics of this phenomenon. Presently, reports by government agencies, international organizations and NGOs constitute the vast majority of information on this topic, but there is very little scientifically based analytic research. Analytic research work is

fundamental to understanding wildlife offences, and to gaining a perspective on the functioning of the local, regional and global illegal market for fauna and flora in order to identify better ways of countering it. Only with a proper knowledge base can governments be encouraged and held accountable to take evidence-based policy action that would lead to altering the dynamics of wildlife offences.

## **Research**

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- Various communications M. Rice
- Various communications D. Hendry

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Thank you,

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